As the NASA researchers working with the TCV program developed new display concepts and discovered some of the benefits CRT displays offered, they disseminated that information in several ways. They wrote and presented technical papers and documents, and Langley even held a small symposium in 1975 to update industry and airline representatives on the progress the TCV program was making. [Ref 3-19]

The most powerful method of technology transfer employed by the TCV program, however, was its cooperative working relationship with the team of engineers and technicians from the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company. The senior managers at Boeing who selected the engineers to work with the TCV program at Langley knew that the technology in NASA's 737 was going to direct the next generation of equipment developed for transport airplanes. So they intentionally sent some of their brightest young engineers to work at Langley, where they could gain experience and knowledge about the systems in the hope of incorporating some of that technology into the design of the company's next airplane.[Ref 3-20]

In the mid1970s, Boeing began designing that new airplane, which would actually evolve into two aircraft; the widebody 767 and the smaller 757. Several of the engineers who had worked on the TCV program at Langley were brought back and put in charge of groups designing different aspects of the 767 airplane. Delmar Fadden, for example, had been the head of the Boeing group at Langley from mid1975 until January 1977. When he returned to Seattle in 1977, he was put in charge of the flight deck technology staff for the 767, which was responsible for the human performance aspects of the new airplane's flight deck equipment. In other words, Fadden and his group looked at what information the pilots needed to have and how it should be presented to them. Since much of the TCV display work had been concerned with that same issue, his experience at Langley was extremely valuable.

In addition to gaining experience with new technologies and a firsthand understanding of what they could do for pilots, the Boeing employees who worked with the TCV program found their experience at Langley gave more credibility to the work they did at Boeing after they returned. In fact, John Warner, the head of the Boeing group at Langley for the first year of the program and now vice president of Boeing Computer Services, termed the joint Boeing/NASA work on the TCV program "the best example of good technology transfer since the days of NACA."[Ref 3-21] Yet for all that, the Boeing 767 and 757 came very close to being produced with conventional electromechanical flight instruments in the cockpit.

Close-up of co-pilot's position on the aft flight deck of the NASA 737 research aircraft showing "Brolly Handle" flight controls and color CRT displays.

By 1978, the dynamics of airline management and transport aircraft sales was very different from what it had been when WWI ace Eddie Rickenbacker ran Eastern Airlines or even when Juan Trippe and Pan American Airlines ordered the first Boeing 747 jumbo jet in 1966. In the early days of air travel, the presidents of the airlines were often pilots. That began to change in the years following WWII, but the airlines still had large engineering departments which put a high value on technological performance and were very influential in the airlines' aircraft purchase decisions. In 1978, however, the airline industry was deregulated. Suddenly, the air transport industry was a highly competitive business. In a very short period of time, cost became practically the sole driving factor behind the airlines' purchase decisions. New technology now had to earn its way onto airplanes more than it ever had to before. [Ref 3-22]

The flight management computers promised concrete fuel savings for airline operators at a time when fuel conservation was becoming a high priority. But there was no such immediate problem driving the use of electronic flight displays. CRT displays offered advantages like improved situation awareness and more efficient air traffic control system operations, which were much harder qualities to quantify in terms of cost savings. In addition, the acquisition and maintenance costs of CRT displays were still uncertain, and any new equipment raised the possibility of having to train pilots to use it, which would be an additional cost to the airlines.[Ref 3-23]

Close-up of the aft flight deck Automatic Guidance and Control System (AGCS) display on the Boeing 737 in 1975. The AGCS allowed pilots to select different  ypes of flightĘguidance and either automatics or manual flight modes.

CRT technology also was not yet perfected. NASA's 737, for example, had only small, monochrome displays. Color displays were in the process of being developed by several companies, but most had limited capability and were difficult to see in bright sunlight. Yet there was concern that the black and white displays would not be able to differentiate the numerous pieces and types of information the screens would have to display clearly enough.[Ref 3-24]

Initially, Boeing had planned to put electronic flight displays in the 767. But as development progressed, a lack of strong customer demand and the lingering uncertainties about the equipment cost led the company to decide to use electromechanical displays, instead. The engineers at Boeing and Langley who had worked on the TCV program were extremely disappointed. They knew what electronic displays could do and how they could benefit pilots, but the inherent capability of the technology was simply not sufficient to win it a place in a commercial airline design.[Ref 3-25]

Then in September 1978, very late in the development cycle of the 767, Boeing reversed its decision and announced that the 767 and 757 would both use electronic flight displays. The simple reason for the change in position was that Boeing had discovered a customer demand for the technology.[Ref 3-26] There were several events and factors that helped to create that demand, however.

In early 1978, Boeing had begun a cost of ownership study and analysis comparing conventional electromechanical instruments against both monochrome and color CRT displays. Cost comparisons were by no means precise, because the result depended heavily on what assumptions were made about how the displays might be used in the future. However, a number of vendors supplied Boeing with figures and, in mid1978, Boeing presented the study conclusions to its airline customers. The results showed that monochrome CRT displays might actually be more costeffective than electromechanical instruments, although the cost of ownership for color displays would probably still be slightly higher.[Ref 3-27]

At the same time, NASA's 737 airplane was just finishing a demonstration program of the U. S. microwave landing system. During the demonstrations, a number of airline and industry representatives had been given the opportunity to fly on the airplane and observe the displays in action during curved path, automatic and manual approaches in a reallife air traffic control situation. Between the MLS demonstrations and the other display research flights, the NASA researchers gave a significant number of airline pilots and operators the opportunity to become familiar with the technology and the potential benefits it might have for airline operations. "(The NASA researchers) were very open, answered any questions and provided as much information as they had," Boeing engineer Delmar Fadden said. "I think that that was as important as anything we might have done, and maybe more important in the broad scheme of things. Without that happening, I'm not sure that the airline people would have decided to (buy the displays)." [Ref 3-28]

The more favorable economics and the decisionmakers' ability to actually see the technology in use and gain an understanding of some of its future potential, tipped the scales. Boeing's customers told the airframe manufacturer that they wanted CRT displays. Since they still had concerns about symbol differentiation on monochrome screens, however, the airlines told Boeing managers they wanted color displays, even if the cost of ownership was a little higher. The Boeing mangers and engineers agreed, but since they were still concerned about the state of color CRT technology, a twopronged development effort was initiated, with color displays as the primary goal, and monochrome displays as a backup. [Ref 3-29]

The Boeing managers need not have worried. While the decision about CRT displays was being debated in Seattle, Rockwell International's Collins Air Transport Division had been quietly working on a type of display the industry had concluded could not be built at the time: a shadow mask, multicolor CRT display, bright enough to be seen in any lighting condition. While this technology was being used for color television sets, none of the avionics companies had been able to develop a "ruggedized" version that could withstand the vibrations and forces to which aircraft equipment was constantly subjected. Collins, however, contacted the Toshiba and Mitsubishi television manufacturers in Japan, who agreed to develop and build a custom, ruggedized version of their color CRT displays specifically for airplane use. In December 1978, Collins unveiled their displays, and the discussion of what kind of CRTs would go into the 767/757 and who would build them was over. [Ref 3-30

Close-up of EADI CRT flight display showing somewhat steep descent (40 degree flap) to runway. Runway centerline is extended to horizon, the "pole" in the center is to give the pilot something to steer toward. The diamond symbol indicates where on the runway the airplane will touch down if no changes are made.

Color electronic flight displays consequently became standard equipment on Boeing's newest airplanes. Both the 767 and the smaller 757 had very similar flight decks, in order to reduce pilot training time and costs for airlines. Both airplanes were covered by a single FAA type rating, which meant that pilots trained in the 757 would also be certified to fly the 767, and vice versa.

Not all of the capabilities of the displays in NASA's 737 were incorporated, however. The CRTs in the 767 and 757 consisted of two 4.7" x 4.2" color EADI monitors, or "Primary Flight Displays," as they became known; two 4.7" x 5.7" color EHSI, or "navigation" displays, (one each for the pilot and copilot positions); and two more 5.7" x 4.7" displays for engine instrumentation in the middle of the instrument panel. The flight critical information displayed on both displays was backed up by electromechanical instruments in the panel.

The EHSI display was actually very similar to the one in NASA's 737. The EADI, on the other hand, was essentially a replication of an electromechanical attitude indicator. It did have a few extra pieces of information displayed on it, such as the airplane's ground speed, radar altitude and decision height altitude for instrument approaches, and indications of what flight modes (such as speed hold, autothrottle, autopilot, lateral navigation or vertical navigation) were activated. The velocity vector, perspective runway and track information tested so successfully in the TCV program were not included, however.

The reason the airlines chose a simple replication of the existing attitude indicator was to help make the step to electronic flight displays an evolutionary change, rather than a revolutionary one. Theorists and futurists often discuss the psychological resistance to change, especially revolutionary change, in organizations.[Ref 3-31] In the case of airline operators and CRT displays, however, the resistance was due more to economic and safety concerns than psychological factors. If an airline wanted to put a revolutionary new technology in a flight deck, it might have to go through a more complex certification process with the FAA, and all its pilots would have to be retrained to use the new equipment. In addition, if the cockpits of different airplanes flown by the same airline were radically different, it would be difficult for pilots to transition back and forth between airplane models, and the chances of pilot error could increase.

Against all of these potential negative consequences of making radical changes in the flight deck, there was not yet a sufficiently compelling need for a velocity vector flight control law or display. The pilot's task had not changed significantly, as it would have with an SST design, and pilots were operating airliners in a perfectly satisfactory manner. NASA and Boeing had developed a solution that lacked a big enough problem to require its use. Nonetheless, several senior Boeing managers remained confident that velocity vector controls and displays would eventually be incorporated into a commercial airplane design. [Ref 3-32]

In the case of the EHSI, the map display was so intuitively easy to understand that pilots required minimal transition training, which is why the airlines elected to use the new display format. The CRT map display still retained the capability of being configured as a conventional horizontal situation indicator, however.

By introducing electronic displays that had the flexibility to be updated later, but could be configured initially with a simple replication of conventional airplane instruments, the airlines hoped to break down what could have been a revolutionary change into a series of smaller, evolutionary steps.[Ref 3-33] But CRT displays were not an isolated advancement. They were part of a new approach to flight deck design that incorporated digital, automated equipment like flight management computers and engine indication and crew advisory systems (EICAS) and forced a reevaluation the pilot's basic role in the cockpit. By themselves, the electronic flight displays would not have been that dramatic a leap. All of these changes together, however, caused a revolution in the design and operation of commercial airliners.