By its very nature, the TCV program was destined to be an organizational challenge. Because its goal was to look at an entire system, instead of a single aerodynamic or electronic component, it required the expertise and cooperation of a wide variety of people, both inside and outside of Langley. At first, the Langley management was not even sure under which directorate the program should go.[Ref 2-26] For a very brief time during its initial formulation, the program was under the supervision of both the Aeronautics and the Electronics directorates. The problems inherent in that divided structure, however, led the center management to put it under the sole control of Electronics in May 1973.[Ref 2-27] The program was put on the same level as a division office, reporting directly to the head of the Electronics directorate, and Jack Reeder was made the program chief.

Even then, the organization was far from simple. Langley leadership had traditionally tried to avoid separating researchers from colleagues in their discipline, because it was felt that such a move would cause the researchers to fall behind in their field and would hurt the strength of the different research disciplines.[Ref 2-28] Consequently, all the people involved in the TCV program except a small core of program office personnel stayed administratively attached to their different branches, divisions and directorates. Their work priorities were decided by the program office, but their performance evaluations and pay raises were given to them by their administrative supervisors. This kind of "matrix" organization offered a number of advantages and had been used often throughout Langley's history. It also had some inherent drawbacks, however.

A matrix arrangement allowed research programs to benefit from the contributions of highly skilled specialists that the center could not afford to assign exclusively to one particular project. When the TCV program started, for example, Langley had two or three worldrenowned specialists in microwave antenna design. Antenna design was critical for a number of aircraft experiments, including the use of the microwave landing system. But it was a highly specialized field, and the center could not support a large number of researchers with that concentration. Consequently, if each one of the design researchers had been assigned fulltime to a different project, the antenna design discipline at Langley would have ceased to exist. Without the benefit of a central discipline and daily contact with their colleagues, the individual researchers would have had a difficult time staying up with new developments in the antenna design field, and their work itself would undoubtedly have suffered, because it would have been more difficult for their peers to review and contribute to their research as it progressed. A matrix structure, on the other hand, left the disciplines intact and allowed them to support a number of different research projects and programs.

While a matrix organization had a lot of advantages from a research perspective, however, it was extremely difficult to manage or work within from an administrative standpoint. The program managers had no direct line authority to enforce anything, and if a researcher's administrative supervisor had different ideas or priorities than the program managers, the researcher could be caught in a very uncomfortable position. Program work deadlines and priorities had to be enforced primarily by persuasion, which meant the success of a research program depended partly on the personalities of its managers. Accomplishing tasks in this kind of environment took a lot more effort and finesse than a straight vertical organization would have required. The Monday morning TCV program coordinating meetings were legendary at the center for the heated arguments that erupted among project personnel, and many people involved in the early days of the program still believe that a matrix structure is an organizational nightmare.[Ref 2-29]

The NASA Boeing 737 flying over Langley Research Center.

The problem was that nobody could figure out a better way to make a broadbased effort like the TCV program work. Managers in the Flight Systems directorate, under which the program operated after 1985, once studied what it would take to put all the researchers who supported the program in one administrative organization.[Ref 2-30]

They discovered they would have to remove so many researchers from other directorates and research disciplines that it would severely handicap the center's other research efforts. The TCV program simply drew from too many different areas for it to operate as a straight, vertical organization.

In addition to this challenging matrix organization, the TCV program initially had to interface with a Flight Experiments Working Group, as well. The group was made up of representatives from different NASA centers and the FAA and was supposed to help select appropriate experiments for the TCV office to conduct.[Ref 2-31] This structure was soon changed, however, to give responsibility for approving experiments to the program and directorate management.

The TCV program also included a contingent from the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company from 1974 until 1979. The initial plan was for a team of technicians and engineers to spend a year at Langley, orienting the NASA personnel to the 737 airplane and its advanced equipment. At the end of the year, however, NASA extended its contract with Boeing to keep its office at Langley open for what turned out to be another four years. At one point, Boeing had 70 employees working on the TCV program at Langley. Although this kind of longterm, sidebyside working relationship with industry was unusual for NASA, the arrangement proved to have a tremendous payoff. In addition to the support the Boeing engineers provided for the TCV program in its early years, several of the young engineers who cut their teeth on the TCV program returned to Boeing to head up various departments working to design the 757/767 airplanes. The Boeing engineers not only knew about the new technology NASA was researching; they had worked with it themselves, watched its progress, and thoroughly understood the potential benefits it could offer. As a result, they were able to help convince others within the company that the technology was worth considering. In addition, the personal relationships the Langley researchers formed with the Boeing engineers improved communication channels and gave NASA easier access to key decisionmakers within Boeing. Both of these factors played an important role in Boeing's decision to incorporate some of the technologies in its new aircraft designs.[Ref 2-32]

At the end of 1981, the TCV program was shifted from a division level to a branch level, and put under the Control Theory and Flight Management division of the Electronics directorate. By June 1982, the name had been shortened to the Flight Control Systems division and put under the management of Dr. Jeremiah F. Creedon. The TCV name was changed, as well, to the Advanced Transport Operating Systems (ATOPS) program. The new name was chosen to reflect the program's renewed emphasis on air transportation system issues, rather than individual airplane technologies.

In July 1985, Langley split the Electronics directorate into two separate organizations. The new directorate was called Flight Systems, and the ATOPS office was moved to a division level within that directorate . The creation of the Flight Systems directorate also helped the matrix operations of the ATOPS program somewhat, because it concentrated more of the people involved with the program in a single administrative structure. In an effort to simplify the matrix operations even further and to encourage greater involvement in the ATOPS program on the division level, the ATOPS office was moved back to a branch level under the Flight Management Division in 1991, although it remained in the Flight Systems directorate.[Ref 2-33]

The financial, institutional, and industry support the program received over its 20 year lifespan also varied greatly. At times, such as during the U.S. MLS demonstrations in 197678, and in the recent wind shear detection flight tests, the program has been well funded and had the open support of NASA Headquarters, the FAA, and industry. Funding was usually a struggle, however, and on several different occasions, the program came very close to being cancelled altogether.

In the early 1980s, for example, as the program began to refocus on broader air transportation system problems rather than individual aircraft technology, the tensions over turf and areas of responsibility between NASA and the FAA flared up once again. To save a measure of funding for the program and make it less controversial, William D. Mace, head of the Electronics directorate at Langley, agreed to take on a program to simply gather data on MLS operations using the conventional, electromechanical instruments in the forward flight deck. That MLS Service Test and Evaluation Program (STEP) was the only flight test work conducted by the 737 from July 1982 to March 1983, but it kept the airplane flying.[Ref 2-34]

In the mid1980s, the program was endangered once again. This time, the funds were being pulled by NASA headquarters from various aeronautics programs to permit greater emphasis on high speed research. The Langley Research Center management was very supportive of the ATOPS program, however, and fought successfully for its survival. Then, in the mid1980s, the ATOPS program almost became a victim of the GrammRudman amendment, when NASA found itself facing severe budget cuts across the board. The program elements were cut to the bare bones, but the airplane was kept flying.

Recently, the program has begun to enjoy a period of renewed support. The new NASA Administrator, Daniel S. Goldin, and President Bill Clinton are both strong advocates of government support for the aviation industry, and the ATOPS program has been given approval to embark on a huge new initiative called Terminal Area Productivity (TAP). Interestingly enough, the goals of TAP are almost identical to the goals of the original TCV program.[Ref 2-35]

The TCV/ATOPS program has already made a number of highly significant contributions to air transportation technology. Many of the challenges that NASA and the DOT identified in the early 1970s still exist, however. In addition, advances in technology have created new opportunities for research that did not exist 20 years ago. The demands on the national airspace system have grown and changed, and the U.S. civil aviation industry now faces more foreign competition than it did in the early 1970s.

In retrospect, perhaps the most surprising aspect of the TCV/ATOPS/TAP program is not that the work is still continuing, or that the goals have remained the same, but that the original program plan only called for the research to last five or six years. The contributions made by the TCV/ATOPS program have certainly been important steps forward. But unlike the challenge of putting an American on the moon, the goal of improving air operations in crowded airport areas is not a finite, achievable target. It is a continuing, dynamic process that will always have room for new research and ideas.

Aerial view of Langley Research Center in 1976. Langley became the home of the Boeing 737 testbed aircraft when it first went into service with NASA in 1974.