Langley metal workers installing NACA cowling on a Curtiss XF7C-1 Seahawk aircraft for test in 1928. For this work, the NACA received the 1929 Collier Trophy awarded annually for achievement in aeronautics in America.

United States government support of aeronautical research dates back almost to the beginning of flight itself. In 1914, as the world found itself on the brink of war, only 23 of the 3,700 airplanes in the world were U.S. owned. [Ref 1-1] Recognizing the disadvantage at which this imbalance put the United States, a rider to the Naval Appropriations Act of 1915 established the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics "to supervise and direct the scientific study of the problems of flight, with a view to their practical solution."[Ref 1-2]

This was not the first time the United States government had cooperated with industry to further technology. The successful development of the railroads and modern agricultural methods, for example, evolved from governmentindustry cooperation.[Ref 1-3] Governmentsupported research was to play a particularly important role in the progress of aviation, however, from the creation of the N.A.C.A. engine cowling in the late 1920s and the wide variety of N.A.C.A. airfoil designs, to the development of jet aircraft.[Ref 1-4]

In the early 1980s, a proposal to sharply reduce or eliminate government support for aeronautical research led the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) to reexamine the government's role in aeronautical research and development (R&D). After a yearlong study, its final report concluded that government support of aeronautics was not only still appropriate, but was a critical element to the continued economic health of the country.[Ref 1-5]

There were numerous compelling arguments for continued government support of technology development.[Ref 1-6] A 1983 report of the White House Science Council stated that "The ultimate purpose of Federal support for R&D is to develop the science and technology base needed for a strong national defense, for the health and wellbeing of U.S. Citizens, and for a healthy economy."[Ref 1-7] Certainly, national defense had been a leading reason for government support of aeronautics research since N.A.C.A. was formed in 1915. But President Ronald Reagan's science advisor also noted in 1982 that "aircraft are now the dominant common carrier for intercity travel, and the safety and control of that travel are a federal responsibility."[Ref 1-8]

As aeronautical technology became more complex and expensive, it was also more difficult for individual companies to shoulder the entire financial burden for researching and developing new technology and products themselves. The capital investment required to develop a dramatically new aircraft could exceed the net worth of the sponsoring company. For a manufacturer to be willing to invest the money into a new technology, it had to have shortterm, concrete payoffs. Industry did not have the capability or incentive to pursue long term or highrisk projects, or research areas with uncertain benefits.

Furthermore, firms made decisions on what research to pursue based on its value to the company, not its value to society. Technologies that benefitted society but had less certain financial returns for a specific company, therefore, needed government support or involvement in order to be developed. Safety, for example, may be a desirable goal for society, but it is generally a difficult commodity for manufacturers to sell.[Ref 1-9]

By the mid1980s, there was yet another argument for continued government support of aeronautical research: the diminishing level of U.S. industrial competitiveness in the global market. In 1986, United States hightechnology imports exceeded exports for the first time. The aerospace industry was one of the only remaining fields with a trade surplus, 90% of which was attributable to the sale of aircraft and aircraft parts. Compared to an overall U.S. trade deficit in manufactured goods of $136 billion in 1986, the aerospace industry had a surplus of $11.8 billion.[Ref 1-10] But the U.S. lead in aeronautics was shrinking, as well. In 1980, the U.S. market share of large civil transport sales was 90%. By 1992, that percentage had dropped to 70% and was in danger of falling even further. The lead in the commuter aircraft market had already been lost.[Ref 1-11] Leaders in government, industry, academia and the media all began stress that to preserve the U.S. lead in aeronautics and, indeed, the U.S. balance of trade, the country had to accord a much higher priority to aeronautical research and development.[Ref 1-12]

All of these arguments build a persuasive case for continued government support of aeronautical research and development. But they also illustrate an important point about technological progress. From the material presented in many traditional textbooks and scientific histories, it would be easy to view progress as a pure, scientific process that drives itself in a cumulative, linear manner. Science and technology have often been presented as outside the realm of social and political pressures; sometimes abused by leaders, but not overtly directed by external forces. In recent years, however, our view of technological progress has begun to change.[Ref 1-13]

As research and development efforts become more expensive and complex, research institutions have to make choices about what technologies to pursue. Those decisions are based not only on the scientific promise of a specific technology, but on factors such as what the government or industry is willing to fund, what concepts have the highest probability of leading to a marketable product, and what kind of consumer or political pressure exists for progress in a particular area.[Ref 1-14] The windshear research conducted by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), NASA and industry throughout the late 1980s, for example, would probably not have occurred if it were not for the political and public pressure that followed the 1985 crash of a Delta L1011 in Dallas, Texas. Industry manufacturers cannot afford to research many kinds of technologies themselves, and when NASA funding for aeronautical research is cut back, many promising ideas may be abandoned for no other reason than the absence of money to pursue them.

Progress also does not occur through a simple, linear advancement of knowledge and capability. As one NASA publication noted, "Technological development ... will have second and third order consequences, often unintended, beyond the main objective."[Ref 1-15] This notion that advancements may be accompanied by new and unforeseen consequences or difficulties is what scholar Thomas P. Hughes called "reverse salients."[Ref 1-16] A breakthrough may solve one difficult problem, but it may also open the door on a whole new set of research problems that did not exist before the new technology was developed. The computerization of many airline cockpit functions, for example, greatly expanded the capabilities of transport airplanes. But it also created an entirely new set of problems that its proponents had not anticipated. Computerization altered the pilot's role in the airplane and created enough significant humanmachine interface problems that NASA eventually created an entirely new research program to help develop more humancentered automation.[Ref 1-17]

Furthermore, not all concepts that are researched are applied into commercial products, regardless of their intrinsic technological worth. Like progress itself, technology transfer is a complex process, affected by numerous external factors and decisions.

The 1958 National Aeronautics and Space Act that created the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) specifically mandated the agency to "provide for the widest practicable and appropriate dissemination of information concerning its activities and the results thereof."[Ref 1-18] But as the director of NASA's Technology Utilization office noted in 1963, "In this age of automation, there is nothing automatic about the transfer of knowledge or the application of an idea or invention to practical use."[Ref 1-19]

More recently, one industry publication listed some of what it called the "technology transfer myths," which included the idea that industry automatically "gobbles up" new technology as soon as it is revealed; that a "better mousetrap" is selfevident and doesn't need selling; and that "exciting and valid" technology will "automatically" be transferred.[Ref 1-20]

The reality is that there are many factors that complicate and influence the transfer of technology from government research institutions like NASA to industry. Technologies that represent a significant change in equipment or procedures, for example, may face opposition simply because of an inherent tendency on the part of people and organizations to resist change.

Theorists argue that radical new methods, technology, or scientific theories require a shift in "paradigms," or accepted truths, in order to be adopted, which is a difficult task for people or organizations.[Ref 1-21] Pilots accustomed to mechanical controls may not trust electronic flight computers, for example, because their use involves a departure from the control principles the pilots were taught and have used successfully for years. If a revolutionary new approach or technology becomes the norm, it also makes individuals' and companies' past experience, success, and expertise in the outdated method irrelevant. Consequently, individuals or companies who have achieved significant prestige through the use of an existing technology may resist replacing it with a new one, no matter how good the replacement is.[Ref 1-22]

Large, established companies also have a lot at risk, and they are often reluctant to bet the company on an untried technology. Not surprisingly, therefore, new ideas or designs are often incorporated first by small companies, or companies at the fringe of industries, who have to take greater risks to gain the necessary market share to survive.[Ref 1-23] Airbus Industries, for example, has incorporated more advanced technology into its aircraft, including full flybywire controls, than the U.S. transport aircraft manufacturers have. But the European consortium had more motivation to innovate and less to lose than its U.S. counterparts. Boeing and McDonnell Douglas held such a commanding market position that unless Airbus distinguished itself significantly in some manner, it would be lost in Boeing's shadow.[Ref 1-24]

In addition, there are a number of concrete, business reasons why some technologies are not adopted by industry. The costeffectiveness of a new concept, for example, plays a critical role in whether or not it is ever incorporated into a commercial product. To a research engineer at the Langley Research Center, success is usually measured in terms of technical objectives met. Industry, on the other hand, measures innovative success in terms of profit gained within a specific period of time. A new transport technology developed at NASA may work flawlessly and may greatly expand an airplane's capabilities, but if it is not going to translate into a profitable investment for a manufacturer or an airline, it is not likely to be applied by industry.[Ref 1-25]

External factors that affect the overall economic situation of an industry can make cost an even greater concern. For example, the deregulation of the airline industry in 1978 made the business much more competitive. As a result, accountants became more powerful players in purchase decisions, and airlines and airframe manufacturers became much more likely to reject new technology unless it was going to show a concrete, shortterm profit.[Ref 1-26]

The cost of a new piece of technology is also not limited solely to its development or purchase price. If too dramatic a change is made in any area of a commercial airplane, the design may have to be recertified by the FAA, which can be a very expensive process. New cockpit equipment may require an airline to retrain all of its pilots, causing the carrier to incur substantial additional costs. Consequently, a revolutionary new design usually has to offer some significant savings in order for a manufacturer to consider it a worthwhile investment.

Of course, in order to debate the costeffectiveness of a new technology, industry first has to know about and understand what it is and what its benefits might be. The information has to be communicated effectively not only from NASA to industry engineers, but also from those engineers to all the decision makers in a particular company. If any part of that communication fails, the technology may not even be considered for a new product.

As technology has become more complex, transferring information about new concepts to the key people in industry has become more of a challenge. For years, the bulk of information about NASA research results was transferred through written documentation, such as technical memoranda, technical papers, articles in professional journals, and tech briefs, and through professional conferences. In fact, a 1992 study of NASA's technology transfer activities found that researchers still often viewed successful transfer as writing a report on research results after the work was completed.[Ref 1-27]

Yet there is a growing consensus that technology transfer efforts stand a much greater chance of success if they occur as part of the technology development process, through personal contact between NASA and industry engineers, instead of through a passive, sterile document issued after the research is completed.

By involving industry earlier in the development process, researchers can help insure that the effort is relevant to industry's needs, and the potential users get to observe and contribute to the development and progress of a new technology. By the time the research is completed, the users already understand it and are in a much better position to sell it to the rest of the company decisionmakers.[Ref 1-28]

One method of involving industry researchers in technology development projects is through cooperative research efforts between NASA and one or more private companies. This approach not only shares the cost burden of the research, it also creates a group of professionals within the company that thoroughly understand the technology and can advocate its incorporation into a new product. In addition, these arrangements virtually guarantee that the research will be seriously considered by at least one company. Even if a research project is not a joint effort, however, bringing in industry representatives for input, evaluation, and demonstrations of new technology can be invaluable in gaining industry interest and support of its use in a commercial application.

Demonstrations actually can be extremely effective in convincing industry to pursue a commercial application of a technology . Old adages like "A picture is worth a thousand words," and "Seeing is believing," emphasize the power of visual demonstration. Although it might take many pages in a technical paper to explain exactly how a concept works, a demonstration can show, very clearly and persuasively, what the technology can do. A demonstration can also give a piece of technology a critical measure of credibility, because it proves the concept will work, at least in a test setting. This, in turn, can give industry enough confidence to commit to a commercial development program.[Ref 1-29]

The importance of this credibility was underscored by H. W. Withington, the former Vice President of Engineering at the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, in a letter to a manager at the NASA Langley Research Center. He emphasized that "laboratory development has great appeal and usually gets substantial government support. However, ...the attainment of credibility...is (also) an important national issue. It is during this second phase that a technical concept achieves a state of readiness, validation and credibility such that private industry and financing can assume the attendant risks."[Ref 1-30]

Giving industry information about and confidence in a new concept is still only one step, and one factor, in the technology application process, however. Even if industry representatives are included at an early stage in the research, there is continual contact and communication between government and industry representatives, and the technology is persuasively demonstrated, a concept still may not be incorporated into a commercial application. By the same token, some research transferred less perfectly may be adopted immediately by industry if, for example, federal regulations mandate that it be incorporated into forthcoming products.

Yet although it can be a complex and often frustrating process, successful technology transfer is a critical step in advancing America's aeronautical industry. In early 1993, NASA Administrator Daniel S. Goldin stated that "the transfer of our valuable technology ... must be proactively sought and given the highest priority."[Ref 1-31]

Goldin's words marked a renewed emphasis on technology transfer within the aeronautics and space agency. But for the engineers, pilots, researchers and staff who worked with the Terminal Configured Vehicle/Air Transport Operating Systems program at the Langley Research Center in Virginia, Goldin was simply restating a philosophy they had lived with for the past 20 years.

In 1973, a group of engineers at the Langley Research Center created the Terminal Configured Vehicle research program and successfully argued for the purchase of a Boeing 737 research aircraft in which to develop, test, and demonstrate advanced technologies for use by the commercial air transport industry. Over the course of the next two decades, the airplane was involved in more than 20 different research projects, most of which were focused on improving the efficiency, capacity, and safety of the air transportation system. Some of the technologies were developed into commercial applications and have had a significant impact on air transport operations. Others, equally worthy from a technical point of view, have yet to be applied.

Because it played a role in so many different projects, with widely differing results and applications, the story of NASA's 737 airplane offers a unique opportunity to examine the forces and factors that influence the development and application of new technology. Furthermore, although the Langley engineers did not set out to explore creative methods of technology transfer, their experience with the airplane and its numerous research projects contains some important lessons about how technology transfer can be accomplished, and the difference a facility like the 737 research airplane can make.